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1. The Larger Picture 
Today innovation or technological change
1 is seen as a prime motive force behind economic growth.
2 
The innovation in a given country may be conducted by domestic entities and/or foreign entities 
resident there. For many countries, the latter or the research and development activities of 
multinationals may be a notable source of both technology transfer as well as technology diffusion. 
Thus, Harrison (1994) avers that new technology may not always be available on the market via 
licensing arrangements; so that joint ventures with innovating multinationals may be the best means 
of learning new technology. Further, such tie-ups with foreign innovating firms may be the best 
source of certain forms of managerial human capital formation, with possible spillovers into the 
domestic economy. While this may be more likely in the case of developing countries (which have 
been net technology-importers), it may be true of developed countries as well (insofar as technical and 
scientific manpower moves between firms in developed countries too). To the extent that such 
spillovers are a more important mode of technology transfer and diffusion for developing countries 
(e.g. Javorcik 2004a, Poole 2008), it is a mode these countries are oftentimes exhorted to encourage 
(United Nations 1974). Of the alternative instruments that exist to encourage multinational R&D and 
innovation, the strength of intellectual property protection in the host nation is arguably a potentially 
important one.
3 The use of the instrument of intellectual property protection, however, has been 
extremely vexed. It was only after rather long drawn-out and bitter negotiations between the 
developing and developed countries that the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property rights 
was inked in 1994. The actual implementation of the agreement, however, took several more years, 
with many developing countries amending their domestic intellectual property protection laws only by 
the very fag end of 2004, the end of their implementation period. And even so, in the field of 
  2agriculture, many countries opted for a sui generis form of protection that is considered weaker than 
patent protection.  
One of the prime concerns, needless to add, has been whether stronger protection does in fact 
spur domestic innovation. The empirical evidence in this regard has not been very helpful either. 
While Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), and Lerner (2002) find that stronger protection does not 
stimulate innovation, Kanwar and Evenson (2003), and Chen and Puttitanum (2005) find that it does. 
Even if the latter verdict is accepted, there is still not much clarity about which sectors of the economy 
would benefit the most from stronger protection. Mansfield (1986) and Levin et.al (1987) present 
somewhat impressionistic evidence based on surveys of R&D executives in various American 
industries, to show that while patent protection is considered overwhelmingly important in the 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries, it rates much lower in the protection of other industries. 
Qian (2007) concludes, that although domestic pharmaceutical patent protection does not stimulate 
domestic pharmaceutical innovation, domestic innovation does accelerate in countries with higher 
overall economics development. In her review of the available evidence, Hall (2007) adds software 
and biotechnology to this list. Empirical evidence also shows stronger protection to matter in the field 
of agriculture in general (Alfranca and Huffman 2003).
4  
Domestic innovation, however, is only part of the story. Stronger protection is also supposed 
to benefit technology transfer. None of the empirical studies cited in the previous paragraph consider 
this phenomenon. Of course, the transfer of technology is a complex process, and occurs through 
various means. Some of the more important channels appear to be trade, foreign direct investment, 
licensing and overseas R&D by multinationals. Ferrantino (1993), Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and 
Smith (1999, 2001) provide evidence supporting the positive effect of stronger protection on trade. 
Similarly, Ferrantino (1993), Lee and Mansfield (1996), and Javorcik (2004b) find that stronger 
protection encourages foreign direct investment. McCalman (2004) shows that, in the context of 
certain industries, this relationship is likely to be non-linear. 
Both these forms of technology transfer are, however, indirect in nature. The more direct 
modes of transfer are licensing and overseas R&D.
5 Yang and Maskus (2001), and Branstetter, 
Fisman and Foley (2006) report that stronger protection does in fact stimulate technology transfer as 
  3measured by royalties and license fees. Note, however, that an increase in royalty and license fees 
could be entirely on account of an increase in the cost of technology transfer (i.e. the ‘price’ of the 
license so to speak), and does not necessarily imply an increase in the number of (new) licenses per 
se. Further, Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) report rather weak results regarding the effect of 
stronger protection on overseas R&D investment – the index of protection dummy they use is 
statistically insignificant in five of the six regressions reported (see their Table IV, p. 340).
6 
Additionally, their analysis is limited to mostly developing countries, which account for a very small 
percentage of the total R&D investment undertaken by the majority-owned overseas affiliates of US 
firms. Thus, in 1999 (the end of their sample period), the countries in their sample accounted for just 
16.2% of the total overseas R&D investment of the majority-owned foreign affiliates of US 
multinationals; and of this, about 8.4 percentage points was the share of Japan alone, implying that the 
remaining 15 countries accounted for less than 8% of the total overseas R&D investment in question. 
Obviously, this would lead us to question the general applicability of their results. 
  Our study focuses on this latter-most mode of technology transfer – namely, the overseas 
R&D investment by majority-owned foreign affiliates of US firms – and attempts to gauge whether, 
in what direction, and to what extent it is influenced by the strength of intellectual property protection 
that the host nations provide. In doing so, we consider all countries for which such (and other 
relevant) data are available, and do not limit the set of countries to just the developing or the 
developed. Nor does our analysis employ an index of protection measure that is episode-specific or 
country-specific. Using alternative measures of the strength of intellectual property protection over 
the period 1977-2004, our analysis shows that the strength of protection was probably an insignificant 
determinant of (at least this mode of) technology transfer. Subsequent analysis shows this result to be 
robust to the possibility of simultaneity bias, if any. Section 2 fleshes out the basic estimation model 
of this paper, and extensions thereof. Section 3 provides some detailed information about the data 
employed. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. Section 5 deals with the possibility of 
endogeneity in the ‘treatment variable’. And finally, section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
  42. The Estimation Model 
2.1 One mode of technology transfer 
The regressand in our estimation exercises is (the total)
7 overseas research and development 
investment undertaken by the (majority-owned) affiliates of US firms in a given country, as a 
proportion of the gross product of these affiliates (RDPA). A majority-owned foreign affiliate is one 
in which the direct and indirect ownership interest of a US parent(s) exceeds 50%; so that the latter 
may be presumed to exercise unambiguous control over the former. The R&D investment undertaken 
by the affiliates in a given country may, then, be causally related to various characteristic features of 
both those affiliates as well as that (host) country. Of course, this variable is an underestimate of the 
technology transfer involved insofar as it does not account for the subsequent spillover effects; 
however, there is no obvious way of remedying this. 
 
2.2 Factors which might explain such technology transfer 
2.2.1 The ‘treatment variable’ 
The main regressor of interest or the ‘treatment variable’ in our model is the strength of intellectual 
property protection in the host countries, i.e. the countries receiving R&D investment from US 
multinationals. Since this variable is of major interest, we use two different indices of this variable 
available in the literature; although for various reasons that we will make clear, the second index is 
relatively preferable. The first index that we employ is one that is reported by the World Economic 
Forum in its Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, various years). This index 
(IPWEF) is based on surveys of the opinions and experiences of individuals, regarding the strength of 
intellectual property protection in their specific countries. It is purportedly computed in this 
impressionistic manner precisely ‘to capture what might not be reflected in official statistics’. It 
relates to the overall intellectual property climate in countries, as opposed to the Ginarte-Park index 
(discussed next) which focuses on patent rights only. While this may appear to be a strength of this 
index at first sight, it may well be its weakness insofar as countries provide differing strengths of 
protection to different forms of intellectual property. 
  5The second index we use is taken from Ginarte and Park (1997), and Park (2008). Their index 
is superior to that of the World Economic Forum, in that it is not based on subjective or ad hoc 
perceptions; on the contrary, it employs objective criteria to manifest the strength of protection a 
nation provides. It considers several aspects of patent protection, which makes for greater variation in 
the index even for the developed countries. Specifically, it considers five aspects of patent laws – 
extent of coverage (i.e. the matter that can be patented), duration of protection (i.e. the number of 
years of protection), membership of international property rights agreements,
 8 potential revocation of 
the patent rights once granted (e.g. through provisions such as compulsory licensing), and 
enforcement mechanisms available in different countries. For each of these five aspects a country 
receives a score ranging from 0 to 1, a larger score indicating stronger protection in that aspect; which 
yields five sub-indices – the index of coverage (ICOV), the index of duration (IDUR), the index of 
membership (IMEM), the index of potential revocation (IREV), and the index of enforcement (IENF). 
The overall Ginarte-Park index IPGP is computed as the aggregate of these five sub-indices, so that it 
ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating stronger patent protection. Not only is it 
computationally superior to the previous index IPWEF, it is also available for a larger set of countries 
and a larger number of time periods. The coefficient of correlation between the World Economic 
Forum index and the Ginarte-Park index is 0.71.
9
 
2.2.2 The control variables 
While the strength of intellectual property protection is the ‘treatment variable’ in our model, given 
that the treatment level has not been randomly assigned across countries, we need to control for the 
other factors that influence overseas R&D by US multinationals. Research in this area shows that a lot 
of overseas R&D is undertaken to cater to the special design needs of the host markets (Mansfield, 
Teece and Romeo 1979). It is reasonable to argue that multinationals are likely to respond thus, only 
to the extent that the host market in question matters to them. Conversely, if the host country market 
is small, the multinationals are not likely to be sensitive to local requirements. The size of the host 
country market may, therefore, be used to represent this consideration for local/regional preferences. 
We use the host country sales
10 of the subsidiary (SALES) to proxy this complex factor. 
  6  Internal funds are arguably very important for R&D investment in general (Hall 1992) and, 
presumably, for overseas R&D investment as well. While parent multinationals may earmark funds 
for their overseas subsidiaries, an important component of subsidiary R&D is likely to be the savings 
generated by the subsidiaries themselves. One reason why financial institutions are reluctant to lend 
for such purposes is the high risk of such investments; what return such investments are likely to fetch 
is highly uncertain. As a result, internal funds acquire a lot of importance. Using data on this variable 
obviates the need for separate data on variables such as host country corporate tax rates, because those 
would be implicit in the savings data.
11 We capture this variable (INTFUNDS) in terms of the net 
income of the majority-owned affiliates in various countries as a proportion of their gross product. 
Since the net income of affiliates is computed as gross revenue minus costs minus foreign taxes, it 
accounts for any R&D tax incentives that foreign governments give to the affiliates. Usually, R&D 
tax incentives allow the affiliates to pay taxes at some concessional tax rate (as compared to the rate at 
which they would have to pay if they did not conduct R&D). Thus, R&D tax incentives merely lower 
the affiliates’ tax liability, and leave them with a higher net income. 
  Multinationals conduct R&D abroad to benefit from various local advantages that may obtain. 
Thus, the availability of abundant and well-qualified technical and scientific manpower in the host 
nation might be an attractor (Mansfield, Teece and Romeo 1979). Given the paucity of data on the 
stock of such manpower, however, we use the stock of human capital as a proxy. The latter is defined 
as the average gross enrollment rate in primary, secondary and tertiary education in the host country 
(ENROLL). 
  Openness of the host nation to trade and investment from abroad would be an important 
consideration in what R&D investment it attracts. While none of the competing measures of openness 
available in the literature are considered entirely satisfactory in this regard, we use the “freedom to 
trade” sub-index computed by Gwartney, Lawson and Norton (2008). This sub-index incorporates 
various aspects of trade openness such as taxes on international trade, regulatory trade barriers 
(including non-tariff barriers), black market exchange rates, as well as international capital market 
controls. We call it the trade openness index (TOI)., which ranges from 1 to 10, with higher values 
indicating freer trade. 
  7  The extent of economic freedom in the host country would be another factor of relevance to 
the magnitude of R&D investment it attracts. One would reckon that the more interventionist the 
government and the more controls it imposes on economic activity, the less attractive would be the 
market in question to foreign investors. We compute the economic freedom index (EFI) as the 
average of four sub-indices constructed by Gwartney, Lawson and Norton (2008) – specifically, the 
magnitude of government taxes, expenditure and enterprises, the legal structure and security of 
property rights, the access to sound money, and the regulation of credit, labour and business. Thus, we 
adapt their index of freedom by dropping their fifth sub-index ‘freedom to trade’, which was used to 
construct the trade openness variable discussed in the previous paragraph. This re-computed index 
varies from 1 to 10, with higher values implying greater economic freedom. 
 
3. Data Issues 
3.1 Data and sources 
The data pertaining to the majority-owned foreign affiliates of US multinationals are those collected 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce, for various 
‘benchmark survey years’ (Bureau of Economic Analysis, various years). Benchmark surveys were 
conducted in 1966, 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004, for the universe of US firms investing 
abroad. The published data, however, are country-level aggregates, i.e. for the sum total of the foreign 
affiliates (of US firms) in a given country, and these are the data we use. Given that data on many of 
the variables of interest to us are not available in the 1966 survey, we drop that survey from our basic 
data set. 
The World Economic Forum index of protection IPWEF is available for 1989, 1994, 1999 
and 2004, and we pair these data with the 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004 BEA survey data. The Ginarte-
Park index of protection IPGP is available for all the years for which BEA data are available, roughly 
corresponding to the BEA survey years. Thus, we pair IPGP data for 1975, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 
and 2005 with the BEA survey data for 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004, respectively.  
Data on the other host country variables were taken from several different sources. The 
human capital data used to compute the average enrollment rate at the primary, secondary and tertiary 
  8levels (ENROLL) were taken from World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, various 
years). The trade openness index (TOI) and the economic freedom index (EFI) were both computed 
on the basis of data taken from Gwartney, Lawson and Norton (2008), as noted above. We might add, 
that for a small number of observations, although data on the regressand and the ‘treatment variable’ 
were available, data on some of the other regressors discussed above were missing, and so these 
observations had to be dropped. In the regression exercises, all variables are defined in logarithms, 
except the binary variables. 
 
3.2 Outlining the sample 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 pertain to the sample data used with the Ginarte-Park 
index of protection, because this data set was available for the largest set of countries and the longest 
time period. The descriptive statistics in question pertain to the raw data or untransformed variables. 
In addition, summary statistics regarding IPWEF are also provided. A cursory examination of the 
table reveals that the strength of intellectual property protection as measured by IPGP (as well as 
IPWEF) rose substantially over the sample period, and so did the overseas R&D investment 
performed by the affiliates of the US multinationals. This, of course, does not establish any concrete 
causal relationship between these two variables, and for that we proceed to more formal analysis. 
  We commence by considering the simple correlation coefficients between overseas R&D 
investment performed by the affiliates, and each of the alternative indices of protection. The pair-wise 
correlation coefficients between RDPA on the one hand, and IPWEF and IPGP on the other are, 
respectively, 0.33, and 0.34. The corresponding pair-wise correlations between the logarithms of these 
variables are even larger at 0.58, and 0.56. We get a similar picture from the scatter-plots of RDPA on 
each of the indices of protection (with the variables in logarithms), as is evident from Figure 1. Thus, 
the raw data for both measures suggest a fairly strong, positive relationship between overseas R&D 
investment by the affiliates of (US) multinationals and the strength of intellectual property protection. 
How strong this relationship is empirically, and whether it is causal in nature are issues that we 
attempt to address in the following section.  
 
  94. Estimation Results 
4.1 R&D performed by affiliates and intellectual property protection (World Economic Forum index) 
The intellectual property protection variable reported by the Global Competitiveness Report of the 
World Economic Forum, is available for various countries for four of the years for which BEA data 
are available on the overseas R&D investment of US firms – namely 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004. 
Consequently, we have a respectable-sized panel for use with this measure of intellectual property 
IPWEF. From the results presented in Table 2 we find that the hypothesis that all regressors are 
identically zero is strongly rejected at the 1% level, the p-value of the associated test being 0.000 for 
all the regressions. The regression results in column (1) reveal that the index of protection variable 
IPWEF is positive and strongly statistically significant in explaining variations in technology transfer. 
When we add the control variables, as in the column (2) regression, variable IPWEF continues to be 
strongly significant, although its coefficient estimate drops substantially in numerical magnitude. Of 
the other regressors, the market size variable SALES is also positive and highly significant. When we 
add the year fixed effects, as in the column (3) regression, the index of protection variable and the 
market size variable continue to be positive and strongly significant. An F-test of exclusion 
restrictions on the year fixed effects is strongly rejected. When we further allow for the presence of a 
non-scalar error variance-covariance matrix, as in the ‘full’ random effects specification presented in 
column (4), we still find the index of protection to be positive and very strongly significant. So also is 
the market size variable SALES. Note also that the coefficient of the protection variable in regressions 
(2), (3) and (4) stabilizes around 1.1, and is associated with a 95% confidence interval with a lower 
limit of approximately 0.25-0.30 and an upper limit of about 1.9-2.0, indicating a high probability of a 
‘large’ positive effect of a change in the index of protection on the regressand. These results are 
subjected to serious doubt, however, when we add the country fixed effects as in regression (5). The 
index of protection variable continues to be positive, and appears to approach significance using a 
one-tail test, although it halves in magnitude to about 0.6. The associated 95% confidence interval 
now becomes (–0.3, 1.5), which while implying a high probability of a substantial positive effect of 
the treatment variable on the regressand, leaves enough room for the possibility of an insignificant 
effect as well.  
  10 
4.2 R&D performed by affiliates and intellectual property protection (Ginarte-Park index) 
The Ginarte-Park index of protection is available for all the years for which BEA data are available on 
overseas R&D by US firms – namely 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004. Consequently, we have 
the largest sample for use with this measure of intellectual property. Table 3 reveals, that the 
hypothesis that overseas R&D by the majority-owned foreign affiliates of US firms is randomly 
determined is strongly rejected, the p-value of the corresponding test being 0 in all the regressions. 
The column (1) regression suggests that the intellectual property protection variable IPGP has a 
strong and large positive effect on technology transfer. The addition of the control variables in 
regression (2), however, reduces the positive effect of this regressor to almost a fifth of its previous 
value, and renders it insignificant. Of the other regressors, the market size variable SALES is found to 
be positive and very strongly significant. The further addition of the time fixed effects, as in the 
column (3) results, leaves the earlier result vis-à-vis the index of protection variable virtually the 
same. The SALES variable too remains positive and very strongly significant. In addition, the human 
capital variable ENROLL now also has a strongly significant positive influence on overseas R&D. 
Using heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors, as in the ‘full’ random effects 
regression of column (4), all the results of the previous regression remain unchanged, with the caveat 
that the human capital variable is now somewhat more weakly significant. An F-test of the 
significance of the time fixed effects recommends their inclusion at the 10% level. Finally, inclusion 
of the country fixed effects in regression (5) does not alter the insignificance of the protection variable 
IPGP; the market size variable SALES is the one that exercises a positive and significant effect on the 
regressand. Further, the joint significance of the time dummies seem to indicate that forces such as the 
globalization of world trade and investment pre-dating the WTO might also be responsible for the 
increase in overseas R&D by multinationals. 
The choice to express the dependent variable as overseas R&D as a proportion of gross 
product, was made to allow for the differing magnitudes of affiliate operations in different countries. 
Of course, if both R&D expenditure and other production related expenditure increase pari passu, the 
share of activity that is R&D may not go up, even if the level of R&D does. To take care of this, we 
  11repeat the above estimations with the dependent variable defined simply as the (total) overseas 
research and development investment undertaken by the (majority-owned) affiliates of US firms in a 
given country (RD). The results are reported in Table 4. Suffice it to note, that they are much the same 
as those discussed above using RDPA as the dependent variable and, therefore, need not be discussed 
in detail. Briefly, the index of protection variable IPGP is quite insignificant in all the regressions 
(barring the first, where it is the lone regressor), and it is the market size variable SALES which is 
consistently strongly significant. Also, the human capital variable ENROLL is found to have a 
significant positive coefficient in some of the regressions. In the subsequent analysis, we restrict 
ourselves to the use of RDPA as the dependent variable (rather than RD), because this does not appear 
to influence the results and avoids repetition. 
 
4.3 R&D performed by affiliates and intellectual property protection – standardized coefficients 
Although we have noted clearly the relative strengths of the Ginarte-Park measure of protection and, 
therefore, our preference for the estimation results using this measure, presentation of the results for 
the alternative measure IPWEF makes it natural for the reader to want to be able to compare the 
coefficient magnitudes across specifications. The elasticities, however, are not necessarily comparable 
– a 10% change in protection measures of very different scales and distributions across countries, may 
represent very different implied movements in the distribution of patent protection. To enable such 
comparison for those who might be interested, we compute standardized coefficients of the ‘treatment 
variable’, using the ‘full’ specification results (random effects and fixed effects) for both measures of 
protection, i.e. columns (4) and (5) of Tables 2 and 3. From the standardized coefficients reported in 
Table 5, we again find that IPGP has a very small effect on the overseas R&D by affiliates. Thus, a 
one standard deviation increase in the index of protection (which would, for instance, take a country 
from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile), would raise overseas R&D by a mere 0.066 to 0.077 
standard deviation units (depending on whether we use the random effects or fixed effects results, 
respectively). Even the 95% confidence intervals for these standardized coefficients, (–0.10, 0.23) for 
the random effects coefficient and (–0.26, 0.11) for the fixed effects coefficient, indicate the 
possibility of an economically insignificant effect. 
  12 
4.4 R&D performed by affiliates and intellectual property protection – an alternative interpretation 
It may be argued that not just any increase in the strength of intellectual property protection is likely 
to matter. Thus, an increase in the strength of protection may not matter at all (for overseas R&D, in 
the present context) if the higher level of protection is still ‘too low’, i.e. below some threshold. 
Similarly, an increase in the strength of protection may have only a marginal incremental effect if the 
strength of protection was already above some threshold to begin with. In other words, what may 
matter is an increase in the strength of protection from below some threshold to above the threshold. 
To test this hypothesis we re-define the Ginarte-Park index of protection as a binary variable IPGPD, 
which equals 1 if IPGP equals or exceeds the median level of protection in a given year, and equals 0 
otherwise.
12 We prefer to work with the Ginarte-Park index because of the various advantages it has 
over the alternative index, as pointed out above.  
  Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the index of protection dummy IPGPD has a large, positive 
and strongly significant effect on the dependent variable. Addition of the control variables, however, 
reduces the coefficient of the protection variable by almost a third and renders it statistically 
insignificant. As the column (2) results reveal, it is the market size variable SALES that is very 
strongly significant, with the human capital variable ENROLL mildly significant using a one-tail test. 
When we add the year fixed effects, as in the column (3) regression, the protection variable reduces 
further in size and significance; whereas the market size and human capital variables become even 
more strongly significant. Correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, as in column (4), does 
not alter these results. The addition of country fixed effects, as in the column (5) regression, also 
yields similar results, in that the protection variable is highly insignificant, whereas the market size 
variable is strongly significant. F-tests reject the exclusion of the year fixed effects from both the 
random effects and the fixed effects regressions of columns (4) and (5). In other words, this 
alternative interpretation of the influence of a strengthening of protection is perfectly in line with our 
earlier results, which suggest a very weak relationship at best between technology transfer as 
measured by overseas R&D performed by the affiliates of US multinationals and the strength of 
protection offered by the host country. 
  13  Of course, it may still be argued that the threshold that we created – namely, the median level 
of protection – may still not be high enough; so that a robustness check of the above conclusion may 
be in order. Accordingly, we re-define the Ginarte-Park index dummy variable to equal 1 for those 
countries that fall in the top one-third of the distribution by level of protection in a given year, and 
equal 0 otherwise; which is labeled IPGPD2.
13 To avoid repetition, the results presented in Table 7 
are not discussed here, for they fully support those described just above. Given that the results 
presented in this sub-section using IPGPD and IPGPD2 are in line with those presented previously 
using the continuous form of the ‘treatment variable’, namely IPGP, we revert to the latter in our 
subsequent exercises. 
 
4.5 R&D performed by affiliates and components of intellectual property protection 
At this point we must take cognizance of the fact that the index of protection IPGP is a simple 
aggregation of five sub-indices, as explained in section 2.2.1, and it is possible that the results that we 
obtained above may have been biased on account of this aggregation procedure; for some aspects of 
the overall protection may be more important than other aspects. To allow for this relative variation 
across the sub-indices, we repeat the exercises of section 4.2 using ICOV, IDUR, IMEM, IREV and 
IENF in lieu of IPGP.
14 Instead of reporting all the regression results for each of these sub-indices, 
only the random effects and fixed effects results for the ‘full’ model are presented in Table 8. Suffice 
it to note that all the results are in conformity with those that we reported above using the aggregate 
index of protection IPGP. To wit, none of the sub-indices of protection are found to have a significant 
influence on overseas R&D; rather, it is the market size variable SALES that is strongly significant 
and, to a lesser extent, the human capital variable ENROLL. 
 
4.6 R &D performed by affiliates (disaggregated by industry) and intellectual property protection 
Finally, we would like to allow for the fact that the dependent variable is based on an aggregation of 
the overseas R&D expenditure across various industries, and that the results discussed above may be 
biased on account of this aggregation; for it is quite conceivable that the effect of a change in the level 
of protection may vary depending on the industry in question. Unfortunately, however, the country-
  14by-industry disaggregation of the overseas R&D data comes with a couple of problems. Such 
disaggregated data are available only for the years 1994, 1999 and 2004; which immediately reduces 
the number of observations at our disposal by half. Further, for most manufacturing industries, a very 
large proportion of the entries are either zero or not reported.
15 Therefore, we are forced to restrict 
ourselves to overseas R&D in just one industry – the chemicals manufacturing sector, which 
comprises pharmaceuticals and medicines, basic chemicals, and other chemicals. Fortunately, this 
industry is considered to be amongst the most responsive to intellectual property protection. We label 
the dependent variable for this sector as RDPAC. Table 9 reveals that the results for this sector are no 
different from those that we found for overseas R&D in the aggregate, except for the fixed effects 
regression reported in column (5). Thus, it is the market size variable SALES and the human capital 
variable ENROLL which appear to have a significant influence on the dependent variable.  
 
5. Endogeneity of the ‘treatment variable’ 
The literature on intellectual property cautions us that the index of protection may not be exogenous 
(Lerner 2002; Ginarte and Park 1997). Although the argument traditionally made is in a somewhat 
different context (that the relationship between domestic innovation and strength of protection may be 
bi-causal), a similar argument may be made in the present context as well. Specifically, countries that 
attract relatively higher levels of overseas R&D investment provide relatively stronger protection to 
intellectual property. Alternatively, there may be ‘third factors’ (such as political pressure) that push 
both overseas R&D as well as the strength of protection in an upward direction. It is very difficult to 
correct for this possibility given the lack of convincing instruments for the strength of intellectual 
property protection. In fact, one often feels that there’s nothing called a perfect instrument.
16 
Eschewing instrumental variable estimation, therefore, we adopt the following strategy to gauge the 
possibility of reverse causation in the present context. 
  First we estimate a series of regressions wherein we regress the dependent variable RDPA on 
contemporaneous and following period values of the index of protection IPGP individually. The 
regression results presented in Table 10, however, are somewhat confounding. In regressions (1a) and 
(1b) the coefficient estimates, t-statistics, and summary statistics are substantially better for the former 
  15which uses the contemporaneous index of protection variable IPGPt, as compared to the latter which 
uses the following period index IPGPt+1. When the control variables are added, as in regressions (2a) 
and (2b), the verdict remains the same. In regressions (3a) and (3b) that include year fixed effects, and 
regressions (4a) and (4b) that allow for robust standard errors, however, there’s little to choose 
between the regressions with the contemporaneous index of protection and those with the following 
period index; although technically the coefficients of the protection variable in the latter are mildly 
better, the goodness of fit is better in the former. Finally, allowing for country fixed effects, as in 
regressions (5a) and (5b), comparison is vitiated by the opposite signs of the coefficients of the index 
of protection variable. 
  Next we conduct a Sims (1972) type test wherein we regress RDPA on both contemporaneous 
and following period IPGP together. The results presented in Table 11 reflect much the same picture 
as the one outlined in the previous paragraph. In the column (1) and column (2) regressions, again we 
find that the performance of contemporaneous IPGP is substantially better. However, with the 
addition of the year fixed effects in column (3), and robust standard errors in column (4), the 
performance of both contemporaneous and following period IPGP is quite similar, with the latter 
marginally better. With the addition of the country fixed effects in column (5), comparison is vitiated 
by the opposite signs of the protection variable coefficients. 
Putting together the results of both these causality investigations, we feel that these results are 
not inconsistent with the contention that the causation probably runs from the index of protection to 
overseas R&D investment, rather than vice versa. To be on surer ground, however, we re-do the 
exercises of section 4.2 using lagged values of the index of protection variable IPGP. The results are 
presented in Table 12. While column (1) shows that the index of protection has a positive, significant 
effect on the dependent variable, this result vanishes with the addition of control variables, as in 
column (2). The market size variable SALES, and the human capital variable ENROLL however, are 
strongly significant. This result becomes more pronounced with the addition of the year fixed effects 
in column (3), and correction for a non-scalar error variance-covariance matrix in column (4). Only 
with the addition of the country fixed effects in column (5), do the market size and human capital 
variable become only mildly significant using one-tail tests. These results support those that we 
  16presented in earlier sections, implying that whatever bias there may be on account of the reverse 
causality is probably unimportant.
17
 
6. Rounding Up 
In the literature on intellectual property, one comes across claims about the influence that the strength 
of intellectual property protection may have on several key economic phenomena. One such is the 
effect that intellectual property protection has on technology transfer via overseas R&D investment by 
multinationals. Our paper attempts to gauge the strength of this empirical relationship. Using cross-
country panel data spanning the period 1977-2004, we find weak support at best, for the claim that 
stronger intellectual property rights has any sizable effect on the magnitude of overseas R&D 
investment by (US) multinationals. Although we find a positive relationship between these two 
variables alone, and this result persists upon the addition of control variables, this positive relationship 
disappears when we introduce year fixed effects and country fixed effects into the regression. The 
associated 95% confidence intervals, though, do allow some room for a reasonable positive effect. 
Variations in overseas R&D are found to respond strongly, on the contrary, to variables such as 
market size, and to a lesser extent human capital. One implication of our results is, that a tightening of 
intellectual property rights by developing countries pursuant to the TRIPs agreement may not have 
any significant influence on technology transfer via overseas R&D into these countries, ceteris 
paribus. These countries may fare better, alternatively, with an expanding stock of human capital and 
market size. Of course, this by itself does not call into question the overall utility of strengthening 
intellectual property rights; for that would also depend upon the extent to which stronger intellectual 
property rights affect the other key economic phenomena that they are claimed to influence. 
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  21Appendix 1 
As noted above, in addition to IPWEF and IPGP, two other indices of protection are available in the 
literature. Mansfield’s (1993) index of protection is based on the perception of a sample of major US 
firms, about how weak intellectual property protection was in 1991, in a given set of countries. Each 
firm was asked whether the protection in each of these countries was too weak to permit it to transfer 
its newest technology to a wholly-owned subsidiary there, to invest in joint ventures with local 
partners, and to license its newest technology to unrelated firms. The higher the percentage of firms 
that answered in the affirmative for a given country, the weaker the protection offered by that country. 
We can, therefore, measure the strength of protection as 100 minus this percentage. This index (IPM) 
varies between 0 and 100 (mean 76.71; standard deviation 10.19), with higher percentages indicating 
stronger protection.  
Rapp and Rozek’s (1990) index is based on a comparison of individual countries’ patent laws 
with the guidelines proposed by the US Chamber of Commerce’s Intellectual Property Task Force, in 
its  Guidelines for Standards for the Protection and Enforcement of Patents. Their index (IPRR) 
ranges from 0 to 5 (mean 3.41; standard deviation 1.48), with higher numbers indicating greater 
conformity with the proposed guidelines, and thereby signifying stronger protection.  
The problem, however, is that the Mansfield index of protection IPM is available for just 
1991, and the Rapp-Rozek index IPRR for 1990 only, making for effective sample sizes of merely 15 
and 37, respectively. Further, no year or country fixed effects can be introduced into the regressions if 
one were to use these indices. Consequently, any exercises based on these indices would be most 
unreliable (for example, Kumar 1996). Therefore, neither of these indices is suitable for further 
analysis in the present context. 
  22Appendix 2 
Even though the alternative protection variable employed in section 4.1 (IPWEF) was considered 
deficient in its construction, we re-do those exercises using lagged IPWEF, to take care of possible 
endogeneity of the protection variable. The results, reported in Table A2.1, are perfectly in line with 
those presented in Table 12 using lagged IPGP. Very briefly, the ‘full’ random effects and fixed 
effects regressions of columns (4) and (5) reveal that the protection variable IPWEFt-1 has an 
insignificant effect on overseas R&D, and it is the market size variable SALES and the human capital 
variable ENROLL that are important explanatory variables. 
  23 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the data set 
         
  Benchmark Year  Full period 
Variable  1977 1982 1989 1994 1999 2004 1977-2004 
  
Overseas Affiliates’ Characteristics 
RD  54.84  102.50 194.97 288.16 433.26 610.61 285.90 
  (110.89) (232.00) (426.67) (604.02) (870.20) (1142.04)  (695.61) 
GP  3415.35 5346.19 7578.15 9441.63 12974.70  17825.83  9559.78 
 (5883.02)  (8887.82)  (12803.07)  (15011.72) (20949.84) (26914.72) (17339.19) 
SALES    10367.22 16778.41 24071.65 33137.97 50464.45  71846.13  34979.47 
  (17711.30) (26333.00) (40833.36) (51560.97) (75743.46)  (105398.40)  (64371.48) 
INTFUNDS  420.51  502.38  1597.88 1756.98 3368.75  7867.05  2640.06 
 (694.53)  (814.44)  (2382.78)  (2247.11) (5272.53)  (13348.34)  (6561.96) 
  
Host Country Characteristics 
ENROLL  61.10 64.35 66.78 73.19 79.05 83.07  71.48 
  (11.91) (10.67) (10.70) (13.01) (14.84) (13.32)  (14.69) 
TOI  6.09 6.65 6.90 7.39 7.77 7.49  7.07 
  (1.56) (1.40) (1.42) (1.09) (0.93) (0.83)  (1.34) 
EFI  5.34 5.59 6.17 6.83 7.05 7.00  6.35 
  (0.95) (1.02) (1.07) (1.12) (0.92) (0.92)  (1.20) 
IPGP 2.06 2.34 2.56 3.37 3.93 4.07  3.08 
  (0.85) (1.01) (1.21) (1.04) (0.73) (0.59)  (1.20) 
N  37 37 40 40 40 40  234 
          
IPWEF      5.48 6.06 6.92 6.65  6.35 
      (1.36) (1.62) (1.40) (1.63)  (1.59) 
N      28 35 39 40  142 
         
         
Note: The variables are untransformed. 
          Standard deviations are given in parentheses below the corresponding means. 
          The units of these variables are: RD ($ million), GP ($ million), SALES ($ million), INTFUNDS ($ million), 
          ENROLL (%), TOI (index), EFI(index), IPGP (index), IPWEF (index). 
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Table 2: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (World Economic Forum Index) 
               Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





  (0.291) (0.423) (0.442) (0.408) (0.454) 




    (0.100) (0.119) (0.167) (0.399) 
Ln  INTFUNDS    –0.082  0.057 0.057 0.047 
    (0.140) (0.149) (0.167) (0.258) 
Ln  ENROLL    0.373 0.880 0.880 0.684 
    (0.641) (0.704) (0.807) (1.087) 
Ln  TOI    0.119 0.080 0.080 –0.041 
    (0.742) (0.742) (1.070) (1.194) 
Ln  EFI    –0.283 –0.623 –0.623 –0.111 







  (0.550) (2.377) (2.935) (3.627) (6.495) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects No No No No Yes 
P-value (year fixed effects 0)      0.047  0.003  0.044 
P-value  (all  slopes  0)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 R   0.336 0.392 0.394 0.394 0.363 
N  142 142 142 142 142 
 
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 3: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Ginarte-Park Index) 
               Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln IPGP  0.636
*** 0.137 0.158 0.158 –0.184 
  (0.109) (0.163) (0.171) (0.203) (0.227) 





    (0.078) (0.086) (0.105) (0.175) 
Ln  INTFUNDS    0.048 0.082 0.082 0.050 
    (0.072) (0.077) (0.088) (0.080) 
Ln ENROLL    0.621  1.206
** 1.206
* 0.582 
    (0.521) (0.554) (0.671) (0.720) 
Ln  TOI    –0.267 –0.288 –0.288 –0.153 
    (0.378) (0.383) (0.588) (0.583) 
Ln  EFI    –0.063  0.060 0.060 0.015 







  (0.174) (1.891) (2.247) (2.830) (3.425) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.011  0.062  0.046 
P  (all  slopes  0)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 R   0.308 0.329 0.347 0.347 0.233 
N  234 234 234 234 234 
 
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 4: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Ginarte-Park Index) 
               Dependent variable – Ln RD 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln IPGP  1.836
*** 0.043 0.051 0.051 –0.242 
  (0.167) (0.159) (0.167) (0.193) (0.224) 





    (0.077) (0.085) (0.105) (0.171) 
Ln  INTFUNDS    –0.032 –0.017 –0.017 –0.021 
    (0.071) (0.075) (0.077) (0.074) 
Ln ENROLL    0.656  1.131
** 1.131
* 0.190 
    (0.511) (0.549) (0.604) (0.667) 
Ln  TOI    –0.246 –0.208 –0.208 –0.072 
    (0.368) (0.374) (0.570) (0.588) 
Ln  EFI    –0.228 –0.212 –0.212 –0.086 







  (0.319) (1.850) (2.231) (2.648) (3.377) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.021  0.143  0.064 
P  (all  slopes  0)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 R   0.357 0.803 0.810 0.810 0.772 
N  234 234 234 234 234 
 
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection – Standardized Coefficients 
               Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
 
 Treatment  Variable 
  Ln IPWEF  Ln IPWEF  Ln IPGP  Ln IPGP 
  (Table 2, col. 4)  (Table 2, col. 5)  (Table 3, col. 4)  (Table 3, col. 5) 
 
Coefficient  1.1149 0.5794 0.1576 –0.1836 
Standard  Error  (0.4079) (0.4542) (0.2035) (0.2269) 
      
Standard Deviation (regressor)  0.2802 0.2802 0.5643 0.5643 
Standard Deviation (regressand)  1.3449 1.3449 1.3535 1.3535 
      
Standardized  Coefficient  0.2323 0.1207 0.0657 –0.0765 
Standardized Standard Error  (0.0850)  (0.0946)  (0.0848)  (0.0946) 
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Table 6 The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Ginarte-Park Index Dummy 
               Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln IPGPD  0.476
*** 0.163 0.075 0.075 –0.142 
  (0.170) (0.158) (0.164) (0.173) (0.193) 





    (0.079) (0.092) (0.109) (0.182) 
Ln  INTFUNDS    0.056 0.072 0.072 0.065 
    (0.071) (0.075) (0.081) (0.079) 
Ln ENROLL    0.723  1.176
** 1.176
* 0.540 
    (0.466) (0.557) (0.687) (0.706) 
Ln  TOI    –0.228 –0.214 –0.214 –0.267 
    (0.358) (0.362) (0.520) (0.532) 
Ln  EFI    0.033 0.032 0.032 0.083 







  (0.170) (1.507) (2.312) (2.960) (3.474) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.020  0.047  0.068 
P  (all  slopes  0)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 R   0.276 0.337 0.331 0.331 0.251 
N  234 234 234 234 234 
       
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 7: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Ginarte-Park Index Dummy 2) 
              Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln IPGPD2  0.558
*** 0.223 0.132 0.132 –0.014 
  (0.173) (0.162) (0.166) (0.205) (0.224) 





    (0.079) (0.094) (0.106) (0.177) 
INTFUNDS    0.052 0.068 0.068 0.062 
    (0.070) (0.075) (0.080) (0.078) 
ENROLL   0.715  1.108
** 1.108
* 0.531 
    (0.466) (0.557) (0.642) (0.702) 
TOI    –0.218 –0.214 –0.214 –0.260 
    (0.355) (0.359) (0.523) (0.526) 
EFI    0.053 0.034 0.034 0.077 







  (0.164) (1.506) (2.320) (2.753) (3.395) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.023  0.058  0.073 
P  (all  slopes  0)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 R   0.267 0.339 0.334 0.334 0.288 
N  234 234 234 234 234 
 
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 8: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Components of the Ginarte-Park Index) 
              Dependent Variable – Ln RDPA 
                 
                     
                
              
             
               
              
               
              
               
               
                
                   
                     
                   
       
                   
                     
                   
                     
                   
 
               
 
               
                   
                     
                     
                   


















































(0.113) (0.180) (0.108) (0.179) (0.118) (0.186) (0.111) (0.179) (0.107) (0.167)
Ln  INTFUNDS
 
0.074 0.058 0.076 0.061 0.080 0.057 0.071 0.063 0.060 0.036









(0.661) (0.696) (0.604) (0.697) (0.679) (0.673) (0.639) (0.700) (0.686) (0.753)
Ln  TOI
 
–0.191 –0.152 –0.272 –0.245 –0.227 –0.251 –0.239 –0.242 –0.135 –0.117
(0.549) (0.545) (0.556) (0.556) (0.525) (0.535) (0.527) (0.539) (0.532) (0.543)
Ln  EFI
 
0.041 0.053 0.102 0.058 0.066 0.055 0.056 0.063 0.062 0.103


































Year fixed effects 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HAC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  fixed  effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
P-value  (year  fixed  effects  0)
   
0.052 0.057 0.055 0.083 0.083 0.140 0.068 0.072 0.038 0.032
P-value  (all  slopes 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 R   0.311                   
                     
0.237 0.338 0.283 0.347 0.252 0.330 0.257 0.301 0.240
N 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
           HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
          ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 9: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Ginarte-Park Index) 
              Dependent variable – Ln RDPAC 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln IPGP  0.086  –0.878
* –0.331 –0.331 –0.799 
  (0.373) (0.531) (0.546) (0.499) (0.570) 




    (0.119) (0.129) (0.097) (0.322) 
Ln  INTFUNDS    –0.196 –0.013 –0.013 –0.042 
    (0.179) (0.189) (0.180) (0.216) 




    (0.912) (0.913) (0.806) (0.752) 
Ln TOI    –2.173
* –2.425
* –2.425 0.338 
    (1.194) (1.205) (1.616) (1.736) 
Ln  EFI    0.591 0.230 0.230 3.957 







  (0.517) (3.694) (3.688) (3.526) (5.226) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.013  0.077  0.121 
P  (all  slopes  0)  0.817 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.119 
2 R   0.080 0.313 0.377 0.377 0.188 
N  113 113 113 113 113 
 
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
  32 
Table 10: The Effect of Contemporaneous vs. Following Period Index of Protection (Ginarte-Park Index) 
                Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
               
                     
         
                
   
             
       
                   
                     
                   
              
                   
                     
                   
                     
                   
 
                   
 
                   
               
Regressor (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)






























(0.093) (0.092) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.100) (0.188) (0.186)
Ln  INTFUNDS
 
0.081 0.086 0.085 0.095 0.085 0.095 0.069 0.074






* 1.216 1.181 0.301 0.279
(0.601) (0.597) (0.634) (0.635) (0.789) (0.740) (0.908) (0.906)
Ln  TOI
 
–0.543 –0.517 –0.422 –0.475 –0.422 –0.475 –0.354 –0.410
(0.399) (0.405) (0.401) (0.406) (0.566) (0.567) (0.563) (0.570)
Ln  EFI
 
–0.229 –0.238 –0.074 –0.070 –0.074 –0.070 0.062 0.076


































Year fixed effects 
 
No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects  No  No  No No No No No No Yes Yes
P (year fixed effects 0)          0.060  0.020  0.165  0.091  0.033  0.052 
P (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2 R   0.348                   
                     
               
0.284 0.384 0.347 0.382 0.371 0.382 0.371 0.162 0.234
N 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190 190
Note:  Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
           HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
          ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 11: The Effect of Contemporaneous vs. Following Period Index of Protection (Sims-type test) 
                Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
        
Regressor  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Ln IPGPt 0.658
*** 0.335 0.186  0.186 –0.175 
  (0.204) (0.221) (0.236)  (0.221) (0.247) 
Ln IPGPt+1 0.081 0.032 0.245  0.245 0.125 
  (0.206) (0.213) (0.236)  (0.213) (0.207) 




    (0.093) (0.097)  (0.100) (0.187) 
Ln  INTFUNDS    0.082 0.092  0.092 0.073 
    (0.084) (0.087)  (0.097) (0.084) 
Ln ENROLL    0.827  1.103
* 1.103 0.241 
    (0.616) (0.644)  (0.769) (0.889) 
Ln  TOI    –0.551 –0.488  –0.488 –0.396 
    (0.404) (0.406)  (0.572) (0.577) 
Ln  EFI    –0.230 –0.062  –0.062 0.061 







  (0.191) (2.288) (2.579)  (3.152) (4.176) 
        
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No  Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No  No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.039  0.162  0.031 
P (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2 R   0.345 0.381 0.383  0.383 0.173 
N  190 190 190  190 190 
 
Note:  Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
           HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
          ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Table 12: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Ginarte-Park index, lagged) 
                Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln IPGPt-1 0.612
*** –0.082  0.103 0.103 –0.36
**
  (0.130) (0.181) (0.195) (0.151) (0.159) 




    (0.090) (0.099) (0.118) (0.245) 
Ln  INTFUNDS    –0.004  0.064 0.064 0.022 
    (0.081) (0.088) (0.100) (0.093) 




    (0.620) (0.669) (0.830) (0.861) 
Ln  TOI    0.156  –0.262 –0.262 –0.040 
    (0.533) (0.557) (0.806) (0.855) 
Ln  EFI    –0.107  0.016 0.016 –0.098 







  (0.189) (2.325) (2.747) (3.523) (4.026) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.148  0.050  0.331 
P  (all  slopes  0)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 R   0.313 0.290 0.323 0.323 0.169 
N  190 190 190 190 190 
 
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
  35 
Table A2.1: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (World Economic Forum index, lagged) 
                    Dependent variable – Ln RDPA 
       
Regressor  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln IPWEFt-1 0.833
*** –0.134  0.183 0.183 –0.256 
  (0.308) (0.469) (0.519) (0.505) (0.520) 




    (0.118) (0.138) (0.169) (0.458) 
Ln INTFUNDS    –0.014
*** 0.073 0.073 0.059 
    (0.156) (0.163) (0.145) (0.241) 
Ln  ENROLL    0.880 1.070 1.070 1.259 
    (0.838) (0.858) (0.997) (1.180) 
Ln  TOI    0.705 0.429 0.429 0.280 
    (0.925) (1.032) (1.420) (1.592) 
Ln  EFI    1.045 0.923 0.923 0.972 







  (0.585) (3.430) (3.751) (4.394) (6.673) 
       
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC  No No No Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  No No No No Yes 
P (year fixed effects 0)      0.220  0.142  0.922 
P  (all  slopes  0)  0.007 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.380 
2 R   0.257 0.304 0.332 0.332 0.300 
N  100 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: Standard Errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
          ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Endnotes 
1 Strictly speaking, innovation has to do with the technology in existence whereas technological 
change has to do with the technology actually in use, but at the practical level this distinction does not 
help. 
2 This is not to deny the importance of other factors behind growth. Thus, a growing body of recent 
research documents that, particularly in the case of developing countries, a reallocation of resources 
from less to more productive enterprises can drive productivity increases and growth (Pavcnik 2002; 
Hsieh and Klenow 2008). Note, however, that such reallocation is not likely to occur by itself, and 
probably requires policy-level innovations. While such innovation may not accord with the traditional 
definition of innovation, it is nevertheless a fact that certain countries (such as the US for example) 
allow the patenting of business methods. 
3 Some studies (for example, Davis 2004) aver that the ‘original’ objective of protection (to encourage 
innovation) has given way over time to other objectives (such as facilitation of strategic license-
swaps), appearing to imply the diminishing influence of intellectual property protection in 
encouraging innovation. Similarly, Scotchmer (2004) adduces evidence to support the view that such 
protection probably ranks fairly low down the list of alternative means of protecting innovation. 
Nevertheless, one can still legitimately ask the question whether stronger protection (still) induces 
more innovation. 
4 A related but different question has to do with the distribution of the rents accruing from higher 
minimum protection, as under the TRIPs agreement. McCalman (2005, 2001) shows that although the 
distribution of these benefits is likely to be skewed in favour of the developed countries, there is 
potential for all countries to benefit from this stronger protection. 
5 There’s a substantial body of literature which studies the overseas R&D activities of firms, but does 
not consider how that R&D varies between countries in response to their strengths of intellectual 
property protection. For a useful survey see Granstrand, Hakanson and Sjolander (1993).  
6 If we restrict ourselves to their equations (1) and (4) (Table IV, p. 340), the protection dummy is 
insignificant in (4) and barely significant in (1). For the other four equations, they report that the 
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positive effect of stronger protection is particularly true for firms which have high patent use – but 
this is a statement that the protection variable was relatively stronger for the high-patent-use firms 
than for the low-patent-use firms; it does not show that the effect of stronger protection per se was 
significant for either group of firms. The level of protection variable, as we have noted, was 
insignificant in five of their six regressions. 
7 The data available do not pertain to the overseas activity of each affiliate in a given country, but only 
to the sum total of affiliates in a given country. For further details see the data section below. 
8 In addition to membership of various intellectual property rights agreements, membership of the 
North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is considered as well (see Park 2008); the implicit 
argument being that, for instance, Mexico would have to tighten its intellectual property laws courtesy 
its membership of NAFTA. We find this curious, because in principle at least, a similar case could be 
made about membership of other trade agreements as well, in manifesting the strength of protection a 
country provides. This would be problematic, because it is not clear which trade agreements have 
such an effect and which ones don’t. It is not clear either, to what extent trade agreements have such 
an effect, assuming they do. Further, is this effect stronger for a country that is party to seven trade 
agreements as compared to one that is party to only six trade agreements?. 
9 In addition to indices IPWEF and IPGP, two other indices are available in the literature. Mansfield 
(1993) computes an index based on a 1991 survey of the perceptions of a sample of US firms, about 
the strength of protection in a set of mostly developing countries. Rapp and Rozek (1990) compute an 
alternative index based on the perceptions of the US Chamber of Commerce’s intellectual property 
task force. Both indices, however, are available for single cross-sections only, and are inappropriate 
for further analysis. For details, see Appendix 1. 
10 Of course, it is quite possible that a particular location may be used to serve not just that (local) 
market, but other markets as well; in which case, the size of that local market may not be the 
determining factor. It would be possible to avoid this slippage only if one had access to detailed 
information on the exact market jurisdictions of each ‘hub’. Given the paucity of such data, we have 
to rest content with less ideal proxies. 
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11 Ideally one would also like to account for any other taxes such as withholding taxes on company 
profits. Such data, however, are not available. 
12 The median levels of the index of protection IPGP corresponding to the survey years 1977, 1982, 
1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004 were 2.25, 2.33, 2.71, 3.47, 4.01 and 4.18, respectively. 
13 The levels of the index of protection IPGP2 separating the top one-third of the countries from the 
bottom two-thirds, corresponding to the survey years 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004, were 
2.60, 2.95, 3.31, 4.15, 4.28 and 4.31, respectively. 
14 Data on the sub-indices ICOV, IDUR, IMEM, IREV and IENF were made available to us 
by Walter Park, Department of Economics, American University. 
15 Not only does this drastically reduce the degrees of freedom, it would also require the 
estimation of truncated regression models, for which fixed effects estimators are not feasible. 
16 The well-known textbook example of ‘weather’ being an ‘ideal’ instrumental variable for 
identifying an agricultural demand curve is a case in point (see Stock and Watson, 2007). The authors 
claim that rainfall does not have a direct influence on demand and, therefore, satisfies the condition of 
instrument exogeneity. Rainfall would affect not just a farmer’s supply, however, but also his 
demand, insofar as his income depends on what he sells. If one is considering the rural economy only, 
or if one is considering a situation where the rural economy dominates the economy as a whole, then 
rainfall does not necessarily satisfy the condition of instrument exogeneity. 
17 Similar conclusions follow when we re-do the exercises of section 4.1 using lagged IPWEF 
as the intellectual property protection variable. The results are reported in Appendix 2, Table 
A2.1. 
  40